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Remedies. Remedies are means provided to litigants within a legal system and by which they can 
ask for their case to be re-examined1. For this reason remedies exercised against a ruling result in 
a dialogue between judges about the settlement of disputes. Remedies indeed invite a superior 
jurisdiction to re-examine the previous ruling2 based on different arguments, including sometimes 
the meaning or the extent of the law. The dialogue that ensues over interpretations of legal rules 
which sometimes differ from one judge to another, feeds the process of law-making by the 
judiciary3. 
Dialogue. The word “dialogue” in the context of this work is taken to mean that a discussion 
involving various arguments takes place amongst judges on different legal matters. This study of 
remedies open to litigants and procedural prerogatives of judges, through selected examples, 
shows the influence of civil procedure on the creation of a normative dialogue amongst the 
judiciary. The aim is to assess the frequency and intensity of such a dialogue in the context of 
remedies and understand its place within the process of judges creating the law. 
Structure. A direct dialogue between judges occurs within the course of the same instance which 
leads to a rather consistent production of legal rules (I). An indirect dialogue amongst the 
judiciary also takes place in the course of distinct instances and leaves room for possible 
inconsistencies within positive law (II). 
I - A direct dialogue within the same instance: a consistent production of 
legal rules 
Access to the French civil4 supreme court. The French supreme court5  for civil and criminal 
matters is called the Cour de cassation. This jurisdiction is divided into six chambers6 and has the 
particularity of not being a third-level jurisdiction, meaning it does not deliver the final solution 
to a dispute. For a case to reach the Cour de cassation, a specific remedy has to be exercised by 
litigants called le pourvoi en cassation. Such a remedy allows a party to criticise the reasoning of a 
                                                 
1 GUINCHARD Serge et DEBARD Thierry (dir.), Lexique des termes juridiques, Dalloz, 2016, pp. 1126-1127.  
2 This is true for certain types of remedies only, particularly in France: see for a detailed account of civil remedies 
CADIET Loïc and JEULAND Emmanuel, Droit judicaire privé, 9th ed., LexisNexis, 2016. 
3 GHESTIN Jacques, GOUBEAUX Gilles et FABRE-MAGNAN Muriel, Traité de droit civil. Introduction générale, 4th ed., 
LGDJ, 1994, n°s 475, et seq., pp. 442 et seq. 
4 It also deals with criminal matters. “Civil” here refers to the distinction between private law and public law which 
exists in France.  
5 No capitals are used to distinguish this generic use from the expression referring to the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom which actually bears the name “Supreme Court”. 




lower court - usually a court of appeal7 - on points of law. The Cour de cassation will then decide, 
upon the arguments presented by the party, whether the decision of the lower court was justified. 
If it is satisfied with it, it will reject the pourvoi. If it is not, it will then annul8 the decision and 
return the dispute to another lower court of the same level. This return jurisdiction9 will then 
deliver the solution to the dispute.  
Resistance and return. The return jurisdiction will usually conform to the supreme court’s 
decision. However, it sometimes happens that lower courts, also called juges du fond10 decide to 
resist the Cour de cassation’s decision. When such an event occurs and one litigant forms a second 
pourvoi en cassation presenting the same arguments as the first, the supreme court has a legal 
obligation11 to sit as the Assemblée plénière12 which is a specific and rare panel. This means the Cour 
de cassation will gather its Premier président13and, for each chamber, its President, its Dean and one 
of its advisers appointed by the Premier président14. The Cour de cassation sitting as the Assemblée 
plénière will answer the arguments presented by the party and decide whether the ruling of the 
lower court must stand. If it decides that it should not, the Assemblée plénière will again return the 
dispute to a return jurisdiction for it to be settled. The difference this time is that the return 
jurisdiction has a legal obligation to follow the decision of the Cour de cassation15 on every point of 
law it has dealt with16.  
Such an obligation has two levels. The first is rather straightforward: the return jurisdiction 
cannot rule differently than the Assemblée plénière. Such resistance has actually never taken place17. 
The second point shows how serious the obligation on the return jurisdiction is. It could not 
even settle the dispute in accordance with the Assemblée plénière while expressing disagreement in 
its reasons. Despite lower courts’ possibility to resist the Cour de cassation’s positions, procedure 
was designed so that the French supreme court sitting as a full court would have the last word18. 
The dialogue between judges is then put at an end. 
A rare occasion. Such intervention of the Assemblée plénière does not occur very often. First, the 
number of pourvois examined by all chambers of the Cour de cassation is very low compared to the 
number of cases dealt with by lower courts. In 2015, first level jurisdictions dealt with 
approximately 3,084,642 civil and criminal cases. 11.34% of them went to an appeal jurisdiction. 
                                                 
7 Since there are several, no capital letters are used to refer to French courts of appeals. 
8 More precisely, la Cour de cassation “casse et annule” the lower court’s decision, hence the name Cour de cassation, 
“casser” meaning to break. 
9 “Juridiction de renvoi” refers to the court to which the Cour de cassation has returned the case. 
10 Judge entitled to assess both facts and applicable law, unlike the Cour de cassation.  
11 Art. L. 431-6 of the Code de l’organisation judiciaire. 
12 Plenary assembly, or full court. The name can be explained by the composition of the court, as it gathers judges 
from all the six chambers. Originally, this assembly bore the name of “united chambers” was composed of the 
presidents, deans and advisers of all chambers, cf. statute law n°47-4366, 23rd July 1947, Title III, art. 58 to 60. 
13 First President. 
14Art. L. 421-5 of the Code de l’organisation judiciaire. 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/assemblee_pleniere_22/composition_assemblee_pleniere_8601.ht
ml [Online] (Consulted the 13/06/2017) 
15 Art. L. 431-4 al. 2 of the Code de l’organisation judiciaire. 
16 BORE Jacques et BORE Jouis, La cassation en matière civile, 5è éd., 2015, Dalloz, coll. Dalloz action, n° 133.94, p. 747. 
17 BORE Jacques et BORE Jouis, La cassation en matière civile, 5è éd., 2015, Dalloz, coll. Dalloz action, n° 133.95, p. 747. 
18 Statute law n°47-4366, 23rd July 1947, Title III, art. 58 to 60. 
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Only 0.91% of cases treated by first-level jurisdictions went to the Cour de cassation19 which shows 
how rarely this remedy is exercised20 by litigants21.  
More specifically, as far as the activity of the Assemblée plénière is concerned only seventy-two 
rulings have been issued by this particular panel since April 2006. In contrast, in the space of year 
2015, 28,144 rulings were issued by the Cour de cassation all chambers combined22. Out of the total 
rulings issued by the Assemblée plénière, only twenty-two were issued23 after the Cour de cassation had 
initially returned the case to a lower court24 . Within these twenty-two rulings, a majority of 
nineteen is the consequence of a lower court resisting the position of the Cour de cassation. This 
number shows such resistance, and therefore dialogue, seldom occurs. The reason for this may 
be the fear and knowledge by the lower court that, should a pourvoi be exercised, its decision may 
be annulled so that resisting is pointless. However, interestingly on nine occasions the Assemblée 
plénière has fallen in with the courts of appeal’s decisions and rejected the position of the initially 
competent chamber of the Cour de cassation.  
Circumventing statutory law. For instance, a controversy arose amongst the judiciary in 
matters of criminal procedure. A victim of incest had murdered eight of her new-borns fearing 
they might be the children of her own father. French criminal law sets a prescription delay: 
“prosecution of a crime must occur within 10 years of its perpetration”25. The murders except for one were 
committed before 2000 so that when the bodies were discovered in July 2010 delay had passed 
for prosecution to be launched against the mother. However the chambre de l’instruction26  of the 
court of appeal of Paris tried to circumvent a strict application of statutory law. It found that 
there was an “insuperable obstacle” to prosecution as the births of the deceased babies were not 
registered and their deaths entirely concealed as were the pregnancies given the mother’s obesity. 
In other words, it was entirely impossible to suspect that there was matter for criminal 
prosecution before the facts were fully discovered so that the law here could not be applied 
literally and the delay could not have started upon perpetration. However, the Cour de cassation in 
2013 refused the existence of such a notion as “insuperable obstacle”. It annulled the decision and 
returned the case27 to the chambre de l’instruction of the court of appeal of Paris which maintained 
                                                 
19  Those numbers are based on the Ministry of Justice report for 2016 available online at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_CC%202016.pdf particularly p. 10 for civil cases and p. 15 for criminal 
cases. (Consulted the 24/06/2017) 
20 This does not prevent the Cour de cassation from being a very active court especially compared to the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom, see infra. 
21 While unlike the appeal forming a pourvoi is free of taxes to be paid to the State, litigants must pay for their lawyer 
which can be quite onerous especially since the number of lawyers allowed to appear before the French supreme 
court is limited (oonly 112 lawyers in 2017, according to the Order’s website : http://www.ordre-avocats-
cassation.fr/mot-presidente/2017/le-mot-de-la-presidente [Online] (Consulted the 19/06/2017)) 
22 According to the Ministry of Justice report for 2016, 20,412 in civil cases, p. 10 and 7,732 in criminal cases, p. 15. 
23 Others deal mostly with matters of great and/or public importance calling for the Assemblée plénirèe to set the 
precedent. For example, on the extent of a lawyer’s freedom of speech: Assemblée plénière, 16th December 2016, n° 08-
86295. 
24  https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/assemblee_pleniere_22/calendrier_567/ [Online] (Consulted 
the 21/06/2017) 
25 Art. 7, §1, Code de Procédure Pénale. 
26 An “instruction chamber” within a French court of appeal is in charge of appreciating factual elements and 
deciding whether they may amount to an offense requiring that a criminal jurisdiction issues a ruling, GUINCHARD 
Serge (dir.), Lexique des termes juridiques 2016-2017, Dalloz, 2016, p. 600. As such, a chambre de l’instruction should take 
notice of an expiration of a prescription delay and conclude that prosecution cannot be launched. 
27 Crim., 16th October 2013, n°s 11-89002 and 13-85232, Bull. crim. 2013, n° 192. 
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its initial position. As this is a case of a lower court deliberately ignoring a ruling by the highest 
jurisdiction, the latter was forced to sit as a full court.  
A possibly fruitful resistance. The Assemblée plénière issued a ruling on the 7th of November 
201428. Two comments can be made regarding this decision. Firstly, the Assemblée plénière found 
that as a matter of principle there was such a notion as “insuperable obstacle” able to defeat a strict 
application of the prescription delay. Secondly, the Assemblée plénière accepted that there was a 
sovereign power of all chambers of instruction to find if they saw fit an “insuperable obstacle” so 
that the highest jurisdiction itself was not at liberty to overturn their decisions on this matter. 
This case is one of the few cases dealt with by the Assemblée plénière that have set the law on 
important matters. One can see how resistance by lower courts and the dialogue that ensued 
through civil remedies has borne fruit here as lower courts were granted power to decide whether 
strict application of the prescription delay in criminal matters was justified based on the facts that 
the Cour de cassation, as a judge of the law, is not supposed to assess. This statement from the 
Assemblée plénière ensures that from then on, the rule established will be applied creating 
consistency in positive law.  
Reciprocating movement. One could think that in the case of pourvoi en cassation, the situation is 
only that of a well-argued monologue made by each court and there is actually no discussion 
between judges as the case simply moves on from one court to another. However, the process of 
return to a lower court creates a certain form of dialogue as there is a reciprocating movement of 
the case between courts. Lower courts resisting the Cour de cassation is a good example of this 
process because in such a case not one but two returns are made to a lower court.  
Third-level jurisdiction. Such a process does not exist in the United Kingdom. The Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom29 is indeed a third-level jurisdiction therefore able to settle the 
dispute. As a consequence no return is made to a lower jurisdiction therefore there is no 
reciprocating movement of the case between courts as there is in France. However, this does not 
mean there is no kind of dialogue amongst judges within a same instance. For example, in a 2002 
ruling30 the House of Lords overturned a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal 
regarding torts. An employee had been regularly exposed to asbestos and developed a rare and 
particularly violent type of cancer 31 . He sued his employers for damages on the ground of 
negligence. A problem arose in establishing causation between the negligence and the damage. 
Since the claimant had indeed worked for two companies each of whom exposed him to asbestos 
dust, it was impossible to identify which exposition caused the disease and therefore to know 
which employer was liable32. The usual test for deciding whether a fact had caused a damage was 
the “but-for” test, or causa sine qua none, by which judges ask themselves whether without the 
action the damage would still have occurred. If such is not the case, then causation is 
                                                 
28 Assemblée plénière, 7th November 2014, n° 14-83739, Bull. crim., 2014, Assemblée plénière, n° 1. 
29 Initially called the House of Lords. The name was changed by Constitutional Reform Act 2005 which started 
operating on 1st October 2009. 
30 House of Lords, 20th June 2002, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd & Others, [2002] UKHL 22, [2002] 3 
All ER 305, [2002] 3 WLR 89. 
31 Mesothelioma. 
32 Facts summarised by WINFIELD Percy Henry and JOLOWICZ John Anthony (initial authors), ROGERS W.V.H, Tort, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2010, n° 6-9, pp. 319 and 320. 
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established33. In the asbestos case, the House of Lords disagreed with the Court of Appeal and 
ruled that the “but-for” test should not apply to the case because it would result in dismissing the 
claim when such an “outcome would be deeply offensive to instinctive notions of what justice requires and 
fairness demands”34. The claimant indeed could prove that either of his employers was responsible 
but “because of the current state of medical knowledge” 35 he could not prove exactly during which period 
of employment he had contracted the disease. Therefore the House of Lords rejected the strict 
application the Court of Appeal made of the previously established test.  
Shape of the judiciary’s dialogue. Each judge of the House of Lords presented his reasons for 
overturning the lower court’s decision. An example will show which shape the dialogue between 
a lower court and the Supreme Court may take. Lord Justice BROOKE, giving the judgment for 
the Court of Appeal36, wrote that accepting causation on the basis that both employers must have 
contributed to the damage was a solution “susceptible of unjust results. It may impose liability for the whole 
of an insidious disease on an employer with whom the claimant was employed for quite a short time in a long 
working life, when the claimant is wholly unable to prove on the balance of probabilities that that period of 
employment had any causative relationship with the inception of the disease”37. After expressly quoting this 
paragraph, Lord BINGHAM OF CORNHILL in the House of Lords replied: “I am of opinion that such 
injustice as may be involved in imposing liability on a duty-breaking employer in these circumstances is heavily 
outweighed by the injustice of denying redress to a victim”38 .. The judge here gives an example of an 
undesirable outcome of the Court of Appeal’s decision to better argue that it should be 
overturned.  
Frequency of the judiciary’s dialogue. Two comments can be drawn from this brief study of 
the French criminal procedure case and the English asbestos case. Firstly, in the English 
procedural system, the reciprocating movement of cases between courts is less vigorous. This is 
so quite simply because as a third-level jurisdiction the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
settles the dispute and no return is made to the Court of Appeal. This inhibits the dialogue 
amongst English judges when the French process of return, where resistance by lower courts is 
always a possibility39, creates more opportunity for a discussion. As far as is the activity of both 
courts are concerned, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has issued 92 rulings from 1st 
April 2015 to 31st March 201640 which is very few compared to the Cour de cassation’s 28,144 in 
2015. This shows how even more rarely appeals reach the Supreme Court and therefore how 
limited the dialogue is amongst the English judiciary.  
                                                 
33 For an illustration, see Barnett v. Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee, [1968] 2 WLR 422 
where a man went to the hospital complaining of vomiting and was told by the night doctor to go home and see his 
own doctor later. The man died of arsenic poisoning later in the night. It was held that despite the hospital’s breach 
of duty no causation could be established because the man was probably too sick by the time he had gotten to the 
hospital to have been saved so the “but-for” test had failed.  
34 Lord NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD, [2002] UKHL 22, at 36. 
35 Lord RODGER OF EARLSFERRY, [2002] UKHL 22, at 124. 
36 England and Wales Court of Appeal, 11th December, 2001, Fairchild v. Glenhaven, [2002] 1 WLR 1052, [2001] 
EWCA Civ 1881.  
37 Lord Justice BROOKE, [2002] 1 WLR 1052, at 103. 
38 Lord BINGHAM OF CORNHILL, [2002] UKHL 22, at 33. 
39 Of course only when the return is made by one chamber of the Cour de cassation and not by its Assemblée plénière. 
40 https://www.supremecourt.uk/faqs.html#1h [Online] (Consulted the 28/06/2017). Unlike the pourvoi which is 
free, appealing to the SCUK costs between £800 and £1,000 which may also discourage litigants. See 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/fees-and-costs.html [Online] (Consulted the 28/06/2017) 
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Quality of the judiciary’s dialogue. However and secondly, the tradition of separate and 
detailed opinions in the United Kingdom allows judges to extensively quote and discuss not only 
precedents they study regarding the case before them, but also the decision given by the lower 
court from which the appeal comes. By contrast, decisions of French courts and especially the 
Cour de cassation are particularly short and therefore the dialogue is less luxuriant. The English 
asbestos case shows how political and social considerations can be determinant in the process of 
establishing a precedent. Such arguments may be taken into account by French courts41 but if that 
is so it is never disclosed making for a less transparent dialogue of judges in France. 
Same decision dialogue. In the United Kingdom, dialogue can occur within the same decision. 
The asbestos case was settled by a unanimous decision but judges may strongly disagree with 
each other in the course of dealing with a case. In a century-old landmark case relating to 
contract law42, the House of Lords was much divided. Two companies had entered into a time 
charterparty by which the owner would for a certain time leave his boat with the charterer who in 
exchange would pay a certain sum every month. In the course of the contract being performed, 
the steamer was requisitioned by the British Government to be used in the transportation of 
troops in that time of war. The owner wanting to make sure he would regain use of his ship 
afterwards argued the contract was terminated upon requisition of the boat by the Government. 
The first instance judge held that the requisitioning of the vessel did not put an end to or suspend 
the charterparty. His decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The case arrived before the 
House of Lords posing the issue of whether the contract was frustrated and more broadly under 
which circumstances a contract may be frustrated. The stakes of admitting frustration are high: 
the parties are relieved from any contractual obligation. In the case of the charterparty that would 
mean the owner does not have to leave the boat at the disposal of the charterer who does not 
have to pay any longer. The House of Lords found for the charterer and ruled that there was no 
frustration. However this “test case”43 was decided at a very weak majority. Five judges heard the 
case, only three of them found for the charterer. Lord ATKINSON and Viscount HALDANE 
dissented. Each of the five judges first goes over the facts of the case and then quotes the 
authorities he believes are relevant and also the ones the lower court may have relied upon. For 
example, Viscount HALDANE first expresses his “reluctance” to “differ from the conclusions at which 
others of [their] Lordships have arrived”44. He goes on to explain that there was no way to predict how 
long the Government would use the ship for and that its use of it “might extend until after the period 
of the charterparty had run out” so that “the entire basis of the contract (...) seem[ed] to [him] to have been 
swept away” 45 . Therefore the parties were not bound by a contract whose foundation had 
disappeared due to requisition by the Government and the appeal from the owners should 
succeed46. One sees how English judges clearly state their dissent from the majority in very 
detailed reasons making for an abundant dialogue amongst the judiciary.  
                                                 
41 FRANK Ernest, « L’élaboration des décisions de la Cour de cassation ou la partie immergée de l’iceberg », D. 1983, 
Chron. 119 
42  House of Lords, 24th July 2016, F. A. Tamplin Steamship Company, Limited v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum 
Products Company Limited, [1916] 2 A.C. 397. 
43 Case of a particularly great importance because it calls for the House of Lords to set a principle ; Lord Atkinson, 
[1916] 2 A.C. 397, at 412. 
44 Viscount HALDANE, [1916] 2 A.C. 397, at 406. 
45 Viscount HALDANE, [1916] 2 A.C. 397, at 411. 
46 Viscount HALDANE, [1916] 2 A.C. 397, at 411 ; see also Lord ATKINSON at 422. 
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Separate opinions and united front of the judiciary. It must be stressed that such a dialogue 
occurring within the reasons given for a single decision is permitted by the existence of separate 
opinions of judges and the possibility for them to form dissenting opinions. Contrastingly, the 
French judiciary shows a united front. This requirement is based on the thought that the 
authority of a ruling would become fragile if it were revealed that it was the result of a weak 
majority. Authors however have argued that a ruling does necessarily benefit from an apparent 
unity which could easily be questioned by an overruling47. Nonetheless in assessing the intensity 
of the dialogue amongst French judges one must point out that the lack of separate opinions 
greatly decreases its vigor48.  
The dialogue which takes place within a same instance allows a law-making process mostly by the 
supreme court which will annul or overturn a lower court’s decision. Coherence is then preserved 
in the judiciary’s work. However this is less the case when the dialogue takes place in the course 
of distinct instances. 
II - An indirect dialogue in the course of distinct instances: a possibility of 
inconsistencies within positive law 
Delayed resistance in France. Sometimes lower courts will initiate a dialogue within a different 
instance rather than in the course of the same trial. In France, this happens when the Cour de 
cassation has set a precedent49 and lower courts, when faced with identical facts, rule differently. 
Such delayed resistance can occur in all areas. Let us take an example regarding intellectual 
property. An employee working for a company designing perfumes had been terminated and was 
suing her former employer for payment relating to the fragrances she had created. The court of 
appeal of Versailles rejected the claim arguing that such creation did not fall within the scope of 
authorship protection law. The employee formed a pourvoi en cassation based on violation of the 
law regarding authorship by the court of appeal for two reasons. Firstly, a perfume should be 
recognised as an “oeuvre de l’esprit”50 mentioned in the law as the object of authorship protection51. 
Secondly, the list offered by the law is not limitative as it uses the following expression: “By oeuvres 
de l’esprit, this Code notably means: (...)”52 therefore the fact that perfumes are not mentioned in the 
list does not mean they must be excluded from authorship protection. Those arguments did not 
convince the Cour de cassation which rejected the pourvoi and ruled in 200653 that a perfume could 
not be protected under French rules of authorship as it was not an “oeuvre de l’esprit”54 therefore 
falling outside the scope of the law. Since the pourvoi was rejected by the supreme court, there was 
                                                 
47 TOUFFAIT Adolphe et TUNC André, « Pour une motivation plus explicite des décisions de justice, notamment de 
celles de la Cour de cassation », RTD civ., 1974, p. 497 et seq. 
48 However such a remark can be qualified. Dialogue may occur amongst French judges within the same instance and 
within a same court for a same case, particularly in the Cour de cassation. All of its chambers work with several 
rapporteurs who are in charge of issuing reports to judges in which they expose all possible solutions and explain why 
one has their preference. See FRANK Ernest, « L’élaboration des décisions de la Cour de cassation ou la partie 
immergée de l’iceberg », D. 1983, Chron. 119, esp. p. 121. 
49 In the common law sense, meaning the Cour de cassation has provided an answer to an important matter and has set 
a principle lower courts and itself are supposed to rely on in the future although they are not bound by it as in the 
United Kingdom. See SLAPPER Gary and KELLY David, The English legal system, 15th ed., Routledge, 2014, p. 129.  
50 Work of the mind. 
51 Art. L. 112-1 Code de la propriété intellectuelle. 
52 Art. L. 112-2 Code de la propriété intcllectuelle. Emphasis added by the author.  
53 Civ. 1ère, 13th June 2006, n° 02-44718, Bull., 2006, I, n° 307, p. 267. 
54 Art. L. 112-1 and L. 112-2, Code de la propriété intcllectuelle. 
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no return to a lower jurisdiction and the decision of the court of appeal of Versailles stood and 
settled the dispute.  
However, in the course of perfectly distinct trials relating to the same matter, other tribunals and 
courts have expressed a different view than the Cour de cassation and refused to conform to its 
position. The first instance tribunal of Bobigny ruled on 28th November 2006 that a perfume is 
“the result of an artistic research carried on by specialists called “noses”” and therefore is an “oeuvre de 
l'esprit” and as such should fall within the scope of the law. The tribunal added, as it was 
suggested by the pourvoi presented to the Cour de cassation in the previous dispute that the list 
provided by the law was not limitative and the protection not reserved to artistic work that could 
be seen or heard.  
Similarly, the court of appeal of Paris on 14th February 2007 ruled that perfumes should be 
protected so long as “they are the product of a previously unseen combination essences in proportions such that 
their scent (...) reflects the creative effort of its author”. According to the court of appeal, the criterion for 
authorship protection is the creativity and unprecedented character of the artistic work so that at 
least some perfumes could fall within the scope of the law. In contrast the Cour de cassation takes 
the law to exclude all perfumes from authorship protection. 
Sending a message. There was no appeal against the decision of the tribunal and no pourvoi 
against the decision of the court of appeal. Therefore, those disputes were solved by lower 
courts, despite the inconsistence of these rulings with the position of the Cour de cassation. In such 
cases of a decision inconsistent with the doctrine of the Cour de cassation within a different 
instance, dialogue occurs in the sense that courts are usually aware of decisions issued by other 
courts. More precisely, lower courts are aware of the Cour de cassation’s decisions because they are 
widely published55. Here the tribunal and court of appeal knew of the position of the supreme 
court on authorship protection for perfumes. By expressly quoting the Cour de cassation’s reasons 
given in the ruling of June 2006 and quoting authorship law they are emphasising their 
disagreement on the meaning of the statute. These lower courts clearly sent a message to the 
supreme court. Unlike the situation of a return made to a court of appeal resisting the Cour de 
cassation’s position, the lower court’s opposition here is less frontal since it was not given the 
correct course to follow directly by the Cour de cassation during in the same trial. Therefore, an 
indirect dialogue takes place through interposed cases.  
Indirect dialogue in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom dialogue also occurs in the 
course of separate trials. It is actually even more obvious as rulings are written in a very different 
way than in France. Reasons are much more detailed in English court’s decisions and judges 
frequently quote each other’s previous speeches in their separate opinions to better make their 
point and show their approval or disagreement. A good illustration of this can be seen in the 
controversy regarding mistake in contract law.  
                                                 
55 Rulings issued by the Cour de cassation are published in various records: « Bulletin des arrêts » of the chamber which 
issued the decision, Bulletin d’information de la Cour de cassation, and the annual report of the Cour de cassation. They also 
may be available on Cour de cassation’s website and at https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
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Creating law. Mistake “negatives consent where it puts the parties at cross-purposes so as to prevent them 
from reaching agreement, e. g. because they intend to contract about different things”56. The consequence of 
finding a mistake is that the contract is void and parties are put back in the situation they were in 
before its conclusion. The doctrine of mistake did not exist in English law before 1931 when an 
essential precedent was set57. Lord ATKIN’s speech is considered to be “the birth of a doctrine of 
precedent of contractual mistake based on a failure to consent”58 and remains a good example of how 
English judges create law. Lord ATKIN wondered under which circumstances a mistake could 
“nullify consent”59 and established that a contract could be void on the ground of mistake only if “it 
is clear that the intention” of the mistaken party was to get something from the bargain that 
he did not get60. In the case before the House of Lords at the time employers had terminated 
contracts of employment in exchange for a redundancy payment. They later discovered that the 
employees had breached their contract of employment in such a way that the employers could 
have terminated them without paying termination indemnity. They sought to have the contract 
by which they terminated employees in exchange for payment annulled. The House of Lords 
decided that what the employers had in mind upon entering into such a bargain was the 
termination of the employment contracts which they did get eventually. Therefore, there was no 
discrepancy between what they wanted and what they received.  
A bold opposition. This precedent could be deemed a rather strict position on mistake. Lord 
Justice DENNING in the Court of Appeal believed so. In 1950, the Court of Appeal of which he 
was Master of the Rolls61, meaning he had great influence on the Court’s positions, issued a 
ruling62 aiming at counteracting the effect of the 1931 precedent by offering a “more just solution”63. 
A flat had been let for £250, both parties believing that it was free from rent control. It turned 
out the flat was subject to the Rent Acts64 and the rent could not exceed £140 per year. The 
tenant asked for the overpaid rent to be given back to him. The landlord argued the contract was 
void on the ground of mistake as both parties were mistaken about rent regulation. The Court of 
Appeal held, in full opposition with the precedent set by Lever Brothers Ltd v. Bell65 in 1931, that 
the contract could be annulled. More specifically, Lord DENNING MR expressed the view that 
there were two kinds of mistakes66: one under common law, and one under equity67. According to 
                                                 
56 TREITEL Guenter Heinz (initial author), PEEL Edwin Arthur, Contract law, Sweet and Maxwell, 2011, n° 8-001, p. 
310 ; the word “negative” being in italic in the original text.  
57 House of Lords, 15th December 1931, Lever Brothers Ltd v. Bell, [1931] UKHL 2, [1932] AC 161. 
58 MACMILLAN Catherine, Mistakes in contract law, Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 272. 
59 Lord ATKIN, Lever Brothers Ltd v. Bell, [1931] UKHL 2, at 4. 
60 Ibid. 
61 President of the civil section of the Court of Appeal. Commonly abbreviated: MR. 
62 England and Wales Court of Appeal, Solle v. Butcher, [1950] 1 KB 671. 
63  WHINCUP Michael, Contract Law and Practice: the English system and Continental comparisons, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law 
International, 1996, p. 229. 
64 Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act 1946 ; Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act 1949. Both are now united 
within the rent Act 1969 and have been amended by the Rent Act 1977. 
65 House of Lords, 15th December 1931, Lever Brothers Ltd v. Bell, [1931] UKHL 2, [1932] AC 161. 
66 “ (...) first, mistake which renders the contract void, that is, a nullity from the beginning, which is the kind of mistake which was dealt 
with by the courts of common law; and, secondly, mistake which renders the contract not void, but voidable, that is, liable to be set aside on 
such terms as the court thinks fit, which is the kind of mistake which was dealt with by the courts of equity”, Lord Denning MR, 
Solle v. Butcher, [1950] 1 KB 671, p. 690. 
67 In the 13th century, Courts of Equity, initially the Lord Chancellor alone, appeared to settle disputes common law 
courts did not take care of because no specific procedure existed for it. The name comes from the fact that the Lord 
Chancellor “based his decisions on principles of natural justice and fairness, making a decision on what seemed ‘right’ in the particular 
case rather than on the strict following of previous precedents”, see MARTIN Jacqueline, The English legal system, 7th ed., Hachette 
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this speech, judges relying on the equitable doctrine should be able to set aside a contract if it 
were “unconscientious68 for the other party to avail himself of the legal advantage which he had obtained”69. No 
appeal was formed against this decision and so this precedent lived on. The problem was that “no 
satisfactory way was ever found of explaining the relationship between th[e] leading case” of Lever Brothers 
Ltd v. Bell and the equitable precedent70. The two rulings led to a great inconsistency in contract 
law as some cases were solved on the basis of Lever Brothers, others on the basis of Solle v. 
Butcher71. Moreover many subsequent rulings discussed the relevance of the latter case and how 
it could be reconciled with the leading precedent72. For instance, in Japanese Bank v. Credit du 
Nord73, Justice STEYN wrote: “a narrow doctrine of common law mistake (as enunciated in Bell v. Lever 
Brothers Ltd. (...)), supplemented by the more flexible doctrine of mistake in equity (as developed in Solle v. 
Butcher (...)) seems to me to be an entirely sensible and satisfactory state of the law”74. On the other hand, 
Justice TOULSON in his first-instance decision75 for the Great Shipping case strongly criticised 
Solle v. Butcher saying it found no ground in previously set precedents76 and the three main cases 
decided upon it77 “were, in [his] respectful opinion, wrongly decided”78. One can see how this controversy 
has sparked intense dialogue amongst the judiciary. It was only fifty-two years later that the 
debate was put at an end with the Court of Appeal overruling the equitable case of Solle v. 
Butcher79. In the Great Shipping case in 200280, both cases were lengthily discussed and Lord 
PHILLIPS MR carefully admitted that he “c[ould] see no way that Solle v. Butcher c[ould] stand 
with Bell v. Lever Brothers”81. In other words, the controversial case had been overruled and the 
dialogue had come to an end.  
Inconsistencies. Much like the dialogue which takes place within a same instance, if no pourvoi 
or appeal is exercised by litigants supreme courts will not have the opportunity to answer. Again, 
the exercise of remedies by the parties determines the intensity and quality of the normative 
dialogue amongst the judiciary. The supreme court does not get a chance to annul the lower 
court’s decision which allows an incoherent ruling to settle the dispute. Procedure as a 
contributing factor for a dialogue nourishing the process of law-making by the judiciary meets a 
                                                                                                                                                        
UK, 2013, n° 2.3.1, p. 18. The two have been combined by the Judicature Act 1873-1875 and since English courts 
have ruled both at common law and in equity. 
68 Unprincipled, morally wrong.  
69 Lord DENNING MR was quoting Torrance v. Bolton (1872) LR 8 Ch App 118, p.  124. 
70 TREITEL Guenter Heinz (initial author), PEEL Edwin Arthur, Contract law, 13th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 2011, n° 8-
028, p. 328. 
71 For example, England and Wales Court of Appeal, Magee v. Pennine Insurance Co. Ltd, [1969] 2 QB 507, [1969] 2 
All ER 891, when Lord DENNING was still Master of the Rolls ; Grist v. Bailey  [1967] Ch 532, [1966] 2 All ER 875, 
[1967] 1 Ch 532; and Laurence v.  Lexcourt Holdings Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1128. 
72 Lord PHILLIPS MR, 14th October 2002, Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris (International) Ltd, [2002] 3 WLR 
1617, [2003] QB 679, [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, at 1: “Over the last fifty years judges and jurists have wrestled with the problem of 
reconciling these two decisions and identifying with precision the principles that they lay down”. 
73 Japanese Bank v. Credit du Nord, [1989] 1 WLR 255, [1988] 3 All ER 902. 
74 Lord STEYN, Japanese Bank v. Credit du Nord, [1989] 1 WLR 255, at 266. 
75 England and Wales High Court, Queen’s Bench, 9th November 2001, Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage 
(International) Ltd, [2001] EWHC 529 (QB). 
76 Justice TOULSON, Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd, [2001] EWHC 529 (QB), at 87. 
77 See footnote 66. 
78 Justice TOULSON, Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd, [2001] EWHC 529 (QB), at 
111. 
79 England and Wales Court of Appeal, Solle v. Butcher, [1950] 1 KB 671. 
80 England and Wales Court of Appeal, 14th October 2002, Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris (International) Ltd, 
[2002] 3 WLR 1617, [2003] QB 679, [2002] EWCA Civ 1407. 
81 Lord PHILLIPS MR, Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris (International) Ltd, [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, at 160. 
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strong limit here as those examples show plainly how when remedies are not exercised 
inconsistencies persist between lower courts’ and supreme courts’ rulings.  
Dévolution as a limit to the dialogue. English judges extensively use obiter dicta. Obiter dicta, as 
opposed to ratio decidendi, means “a statement by the way”. The ratio decidendi is “the rule of law on which 
the decision is founded” found in an “abstraction of the facts of the case”82. The obiter dictum is everything 
“that is not an essential part of the ratio decidendi”83. As such it does not participate in settling the case 
in point but allows the judge to clarify his thoughts on the law. For example, in Lever Brothers84  
the House of Lords had to deal with an issue relating to contracts of employment. However to 
better explain his views on the principle he was setting regarding mistake as a consent vitiating 
factor, Lord ATKIN presented the example of a contract for sale of a painting. He wrote that even 
if a buyer had entered into such a bargain on the ground that the painting was that of an old 
master, there would still be no mistake85. This reasoning is an obiter dictum as it does not express 
the principle upon which the case was decided. These side remarks, often quite detailed, about 
what the settlement could have been had the facts been slightly different, the analysis of various 
legal solutions to the case, make the discussion quite rich. Obiter dicta cause the dialogue amongst 
judges to be much wider. Prima facie, obiter dicta should not occur in France86. A court of appeal is 
entitled to re-examine all the facts of a case and all relevant law because it is a second-level 
jurisdiction. The appeal is said to be a “reform remedy”87. However the court of appeal is not 
entitled to leave the strict scope of the case argued before it88. This limitation of what is passed 
on to the court of appeal is called dévolution. The appeal is said to have an effet dévolutif89. Before the 
Cour de cassation, the issue presents itself a bit differently. The scope of what is passed on to the 
supreme court is also limited but this is not because the pourvoi has an effet dévolutif. The Cour de 
cassation not being a third-level jurisdiction means it is only competent to decide whether the 
lower court’s ruling follows legal principles. The pourvoi is an “annulment remedy”90 meaning the 
court only has the power to annul the ruling or reject the pourvoi. Therefore the extent of issues to 
be examined will be determined by the arguments presented by the litigant exercising the pourvoi91. 
This brief study shows that the scope of the dialogue in France is much more limited than in 
England where an appeal, whether it is to access the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, does 
not have a specific effect of limiting the subject-matter to be discussed leaving room for ample 
discussion.  
  
                                                 
82 SLAPPER Gary and KELLY David, The English legal system, 15th ed., Routledge, 2014, n° 4.5, p. 153. 
83 Ibid. 
84 House of Lords, 15th December 1931, Lever Brothers Ltd v. Bell, [1931] UKHL 2, [1932] AC 161. 
85 Lord ATKIN, Lever Brothers Ltd v. Bell, [1931] UKHL 2, at 9. 
86 Although a doctorate study is currently in progress arguing that the Cour de cassation uses obiter dicta: HORTALA 
Solenne, Les obiter dicta dans la jurisprudence civile de la Cour de cassation, Toulouse 1 Capitole Univerity, JULIEN Jérôme 
supervising. 
87 “Voie de reformation”; ibid., n° 835, p. 687. That is because it may “reform” the first-instance decision. 
88 Art. 562, §1, Code de procédure civile.  
89 CADIET Loïc and JEULAND Emmanuel, Droit judicaire privé, 9th ed., LexisNexis, 2016, n° 837, p. 689. 
90 “Voie d’annumation” ; ibid., n° 797, p. 663. 




A more frequent dialogue in France. Neither the Cour de cassation nor the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom has the power to rule spontaneously on a case. As far as the French system 
is concerned, only a pourvoi exercised by a litigant could cause either the return jurisdiction’s 
decision92 or the lower court’s decision93 to be examined by the Cour de cassation. The same can be 
said for the English system: an appeal must be exercised for the Court of Appeal or the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom to have an opportunity to discuss a lower court’s decision. The 
process therefore is not systematic. Consequently, from a procedural point of view, the dialogue 
of the judiciary is entirely dependent on whether parties decide to exercise a remedy. Civil 
remedies create opportunities for judges to discuss points of law and settlements of disputes in so 
far as they are exercised by litigants.  
A more luxuriant dialogue in the UK. The tradition of separate opinions in the United 
Kingdom allows for a more intense dialogue than in France as dialogue then takes the shape of 
detailed arguments and reasons. Moreover it even creates a discussion within a same ruling 
which, though sometimes confusing as to what the law is94 has great significance in terms of 
sustaining the dialogue. 
End of dialogue: hierarchy of courts. Both in France and in the United Kingdom, the dialogue 
between judges is settled thanks to the hierarchy established amongst the courts: the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom has the last word as does the Cour de cassation sitting as the 
Assemblée plénière. The difference is that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is a third-level 
jurisdiction which can settle the dispute whereas the Cour de cassation is not and must return the 
case to a lower court to see the dispute ended. It could be argued that such an issue would not 
arise if French courts were bound by the doctrine of precedent as English courts are. Indeed the 
precedent doctrine is a principle by which a previous decision issued by a court binds all lower or 
equivalent courts for the future should they come across a case with identical facts95. When 
judges must follow a precedent set previously by a superior court in a different instance, the risk 
of inconsistencies between rulings decreases considerably96. Consequently, the lack of precedent 
doctrine in the French system allows the return jurisdiction the resist the supreme court’s 
position. Contrastingly, in the United Kingdom the thought that a lower court may downright 
resist the Supreme Court’s position is very unlikely.  
Prerogatives of supreme courts. However as one may have deduced from the controversy 
regarding mistake in contract law97, the doctrine of precedent does not prevent all inconsistencies. 
When an incoherent ruling lives on the process of law-making by the judiciary is disorganised and 
disrupted. Within a same instance, the process of annulment or overturning by a supreme court 
                                                 
92 If resistance occurs within the same instance. 
93 If resistance occurs in the course of separate instances. 
94 See the controversy regarding mistake, supra. 
95 SLAPPER Gary and KELLY David, The English legal system, 15th ed., Routledge, 2014, n° 4.2, p. 129 
96 However the doctrine of precedent is not absolute. The use of a distinguishing technique allows judges to avoid 
the application of stare decisis. A judge argues and discusses the relevance of a precedent to the current case based on 
facts. If facts of the present case are so different they call for a new rule, a normative dialogue takes place. In the 
asbestos case, the House of Lords ultimately found good reasons to depart from the established “but-for” test in 
matters of causation between breach of duty and damage.  
97 England and Wales Court of Appeal, Solle v. Butcher, [1950] 1 KB 671. 
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allows consistency as the lower court’s decision disappears. Moreover, the ability for a supreme 
court to clearly state its position and overrule a previous decision causing disturbance allows 
coherence to be restored within the judiciary’s work on positive law. 
